This paper studies how …nancial development a¤ects the relation between average growth and growth volatility through liquidity crises. We …rst establish in a micro model that imperfect enforceability creates a short term bias in contracts …nancing long term investments. This can generate maturity mismatches between …rms assets and liabilities and lead to liquidity crises. Then with this mechanism, we show in a macro framework that the relation between average growth and growth volatility is more likely to be negative in developing countries, but more likely to be positive in developed economies. Finally we provide empirical evidence which supports the prediction of the model.
Introduction.
Following the …nancial crises of the nineties, many voices rose to explain that these crises were new compared to previous ones (Radelet and Sachs [1998] and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini [1999] ). Indeed the usual features known to trigger crises (governments unsustainable economic policies (Krugman [1979] )) were absent or could not by themselves imply so severe crises (Baig and Goldfajn [2002] ). Instead, a number of new phenomena arose such as the large levels of short term debt …rms had accumulated in the pre-crisis period. Several explanations have then been brought to explain this build-up in corporate imbalances. Two of them have particularly emerged. According to the …rst one, "crony capitalism" can explain the last …gures (Krugman [1998] ) because it has played a major role in encouraging …rms to take ine¢ cient decisions (over investment, excessive risks, etc... ), in distorting individual incentives. The implicit insurance arising from "crony capitalism" prompted agents to believe that they could bene…t from short term debt low cost while the government would help them overcome potential illiquidity problems. The second explanation refers to the "Original Sin"hypothesis (Eichengreen and Haussman [1999] ). According to it, agents …nancial positions such as those described in table 1 are due to …rms inability to choose their …nancial portfolios: Firms have no available …nancial strategy but the risky ones. Although they know ex ante the risks associated with this type of …nancial instruments, they are somewhat constrained to adopt these "dangerous"…nancing strategies because this is the only way to get capital from …nancial markets.
1 Source : Claessens, Djankov et Nenova [2000] . DE. ratio refers to the debt equity ratio computed as the ratio of total debt to the market value of the …rm. C. ratio refers to the current ratio computed as the ratio between current assets and current liabilities, i.e. assets and liabilities with a below one year maturity. Q. ratio refers to the quick ratio computed as of current assets less inventories to current liabilities. Data are for 1995-1996. Although both of these explanations may be reasonable and explain the vulnerability of countries to …nancial crashes, they are incomplete and fairly ad-hoc in their foundations. In the crony capitalism explanation, the implicit insurance scheme or the collusion links between …rms managers and politicians are exogenous. There is no positive theory of crony capitalism. As to the "Original Sin", we need to explain why it can be relevant for developing economies while it does not seem to be for developed countries. For instance, the share of long term debt in corporate debt portfolios increases with economic and …nancial development (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic [1999] ). We need to understand how economic and …nancial development modi…es …nancial contracts to understand the nature of the "Original Sin" problem. In this paper, our aim is twofold. First we try to use an explicit framework which can help explain why private agents do use risky …nancial strategies. Second we aim at exploring the macroeconomic consequences of private …nancial strategies on growth and volatility.
The mechanism of the model.
To answer these questions, we study how the maturity of …rms debts is determined. The mechanism is the following. When contracts are imperfectly enforceable, lenders impose on the debt portfolio of borrowers investing in long term activities a bias towards short term debt. For lenders, the problem with long term debt lies in the freedom it leaves to the borrower. In a long term debt contract, there is at least one date between the contracting date and the payment date and the borrower can choose to shirk at that interim date. In the model, the borrower can decide to stop his project interim, re-invest his capital in a less e¢ cient technology to eventually default on long term loans. To prevent borrowers from doing so, lenders can increase the share of short term debt in borrowers debt portfolios 3 . They then have an e¤ective controlling power because if the borrower stops his project interim, lenders can sanction him by asking for short term debt repayments 4 .
However although this mechanism solves a micro incentive problem, it generates a global coordination issue when borrowers rely heavily on short term debt because if lenders accept (resp. refuse) to roll over short term debts, borrowers are then able (resp. unable) to carry out their long term projects, their …nal return is large (resp. low) and they do not have (resp. do have) incentives to default on long term loans. It is then rational for lenders to accept (resp. refuse) short term debts roll-over. Therefore both the situations where lenders accept and refuse to roll-over short term debts are equilibria and borrowers can be forced to stop their projects because lenders are unable to coordinate to avoid ine¢ cient runs on short term debts 5 .
To derive our macroeconomic results, we focus on the ratio of lenders to borrowers wealth. A positive change in this ratio has, every thing else equal, two main e¤ects. First it reduces the e¢ ciency of the economy because by de…nition borrowers have access to the most e¢ cient technologies. A positive change in the lenders to borrowers wealth ratio therefore generally reduces average growth. Secondly this ratio has a positive impact on the available resources for short term debt re-…nancing. Then, when it is low, a positive change in the lenders to borrowers wealth ratio prompts entrepreneurs to adopt more frequently risky …nancing strategies which increases growth volatility. On the contrary, when it is large, a positive 3 Here we implicitly assume that borrowers face an in…nitely elastic capital supply so that quantities and not prices (interest rates here) adjust to verify incentives constraints. 4 This based on the implicit assumption that lenders can observe a borrower who stops his project. 5 The crises that appear in the model are therefore ex ante e¢ cient but ex post ine¢ cient.
change in the lenders to borrowers wealth ratio reduces the probability that a run would happen which reduces growth volatility. Identifying the case of a low (resp. large) lenders to borrowers wealth ratio to a developing (resp. developed) economy 6 , the model predicts that average growth and growth volatility are negatively (resp. positively) related in developing (resp. developed) economies. Finally we provide empirical evidence which seems to con…rm this result.
Related literature.
Four types of literature are related to the issues studied in this paper. First, liquidity issues have been studied in the seminal Diamond-Dybvig [1983] paper. Since panics can happen in the banking sector due to the fact that liabilities are short term and assets long term, banks can act as pools of liquidity to stop these panics. Diamond [1991] is closer because it shows how …rms …nancial choices may help reducing informational asymmetries with their lenders. In Diamond [1991] , …rms with good prospects are more likely to issue short term debt because their probability of being confronted to liquidity shocks is smaller. Flannery [1986] and Kale and Noe [1990] also consider …nancial choices as signals on the quality of the projects …nanced. The approach in our paper is however di¤erent because …rm heterogeneity does not play any role. It is the nature of long term projects (the possibility to stop them interim) which prompts …rms to borrow short term.
Finally Rey and Stiglitz [1993] is the closest paper since it shows that short term contracts give lenders a monitoring power on borrowers. Our argument is close. However we …rst stress the disciplining e¤ect of short term debt rather than its monitoring power. Second we show that the disciplining e¤ect of short term debt is not cost free since it may come with multiple equilibria and ine¢ cient project terminations due to runs on …rms short term liabilities. The paper is organized as follows. The microeconomics of the capital market is established in the next section. In section 3, we apply this micro framework to a macroeconomic model and derive …rms optimal choices. In section 4, we build the equilibrium and establish the main results as to growth and volatility.
Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2. A two period model of the credit market.
2.1. A capital market with ex post moral hazard.
When contracts are imperfectly enforceable, a relation between the severity of borrowing constraints and the composition (between short term and long term loans) of the debt portfolio can be drawn. To illustrate it, let us consider:
H1: A risk neutral borrower-entrepreneur with initial wealth W at time t who lives two periods and maximizes his end-of-life consumption.
H2a: At date t, the entrepreneur can invest in a technology whose production function writes as y t+2 = Rk t where k t = min fk t ; k t+1 g and k t is the capital stock 7 in the project at date t.
H3:
He is granted at date t a loan L from a pool of risk neutral investors, made a short term loan L (which must be repaid at date t + 1) and a long term loan (1 ) L (which must be repaid at date t + 2). The gross risk free interest rate on short (resp. long) term debts 8 is r s (resp. r l ).
H4: Short term contracts are perfectly enforceable but long term contracts are imperfectly enforceable 9 , borrowers can default strategically on long term contracts at a marginal cost .
A borrower pays for his long term debts if and only if this makes him better-o¤. The incentive compatibility constraint writes as
We then have the following proposition. 7 The production function implies that the entrepreneur can extract capital from his project at date t + 1 (before output realizes) at the cost of reducing …nal output. 8 The interest rates rs and r l are exogenous and such that investors are indi¤erent between lending on a short maturity or on a long one. As a result we assume that no investor makes exclusively short or long term loans. All investors have both of them. 9 The di¤erence in enforceability between short and long term contracts is only made for convenience, to simplify the exposition of the model. Assuming that both short and long term …nancial contracts are imperfectly enforceable would not change neither the mechanism nor the results of the model although the incentive compatibility constraints would be more complicated. Proposition 1. Under assumptions H1, H2a, H3, H4, assuming r l > and r s > 1 and noting = L W the debt equity ratio and the proportion of short term debt, incentive compatible debt portfolios ( ; ) verify
Proof. Elementary algebra on the last incentive compatibility constraint yields the proposition.
The right hand side expression of (2.1) is an increasing function of when r l > r s , i.e. if is su¢ ciently small. We consider this case in the following 10 . 
A capital market with interim and ex post moral hazard.
We introduce interim moral hazard as the possibility for a borrower-entrepreneur to stop his project interim, i.e. at date t + 1 before reaping the …nal return R, to reinvest in a project, yet less productive but also easier to default on. An entrepreneur can claim ex ante to be willing to carry out his project till maturity. But e¤ectively he stops it interim and defaults on long term loans.
1 0 The condition r l > Rrs is a necessary condition to generate a trade-o¤ between the quantity of capital an entrepreneur can borrow and the maturity mismatch he accepts between his assets and his liabilities. The case r l Rrs is therefore uninteresting because trivial.
Incentives and contracts.
Let us consider the borrower-entrepreneur of the previous paragraph and add the following assumptions:
H2b: At date t, the entrepreneur can invest in a technology whose production function 11 writes as y t+2 = e Rk t
is equal to 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise, 0 < < 1 and R > r.
H5: The marginal cost of default for the entrepreneur on long term loans is if e R = R and
There is moral hazard 12 at date t + 1: R > r and r 0 > R .
If an entrepreneur could commit to stick to the large return e R = R, then the incentive compatible contract ( ; ) would verify the following conditions
On the contrary, if the entrepreneur wants to get the low return e R = r, to default eventually on long term loans, then the incentive compatible contract ( ; ) must verify the following condition
As is clear if the assumptions R > r and (r 0 ) > (R ) are true then > . An entrepreneur who is o¤ered a contract and who stops his project to get the low return e R = r, therefore defaults on all his long term debts. We need to determine the incentive compatible contracts in this new environment. The next proposition does so.
Proposition 2. Under assumptions H1, H2b, H3-H5, and noting = R (r 0 ), an entrepreneur who is 1 1 This technology is therefore illiquid: an entrepreneur who extracts capital at date t + 1 not only a¤ects the size of his project. He also a¤ects the marginal return of his project. The entrepreneur must therefore be su¢ ciently patient to obtain a large return. 1 2 The existence of interim moral hazard for a illiquid project is natural because the cost to default is much lower once the entrepreneur has liquidated his investments and reinvested his capital in a short term technology. Illiquidity is therefore viewed as a particular case of interim moral hazard.
served a contract ( ; ) pays for his debts if and only if or
Proof. cf. appendix.
Two remarks can be made. First, under the interim moral hazard assumption, does not belong to the set of incentive compatible contracts since > b . The introduction of interim moral hazard therefore reduces the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs. Secondly, since r l > r s , under the interim moral hazard assumptions we have r l r s > 0. This implies that an entrepreneur who invests in the production technology with a given level of debt will have to bear a higher proportion of short term debt w.r.t. a situation without interim moral hazard. Interim moral hazard introduces a "bias"towards short term debt because short term debt appears as a disciplining device for lenders. They impose this bias to make sure that borrowers do not take advantage of the presence of interim moral hazard. 
Short term debts roll-over.
Let us …nally consider the borrower-entrepreneur of the previous paragraph and add a …nal assumption: H6: Lenders can observe entrepreneurs decision interim (to proceed or not at date t + 1) and then decide on that basis how to behave as to short term debt repayment.
In the previous paragraph we have shown that the introduction of interim moral hazard generates a "bias" towards short term debt. Since lenders impose that bias to prevent borrowers from stopping their projects, they can also withdraw it when interim moral hazard disappears, i.e. after they observe that borrowers have not stopped their projects. In this case, lenders accept to transform short term debts into long term ones. If an entrepreneur decides to proceed with his project with a large return then it is incentive compatible for lenders to reduce the proportion of short term debt whereas if an entrepreneur decides to stop his project then lenders have to ask for full short term debt repayments. The following proposition then gives the conditions on how short term debt roll-over is realized:
Proposition 3. Under assumptions H1, H2b, H3-H6, if an entrepreneur with a debt portfolio ( ; ) proceeds with his project, then it is incentive compatible for lenders to exchange at date t + 1 the debt portfolio ( ; ) contracted at date t against a debt portfolio ( ; ) if and only if
where [y] + = max fy; 0g and r l;s is the gross interest rate on rolled-over short term debts.
Proof. cf. appendix. We have therefore established three results in this section. First borrowers can increase their borrowing capacity when they accept debt portfolios with a shorter maturity. Second, lenders bias debt portfolios towards short-term debt when borrowers can deviate from the project they invest in initially. Finally short term debt roll-over is possible if lenders can observe borrowers'decisions to proceed or to deviate before short term debt repayments happen. Let us now introduce this capital market framework in a macroeconomic model in order to shed some light on the aggregate consequences of the structure of …nancial contracts. In particular we determine how borrowers …nancial strategies impact aggregate growth and volatility.
3. The macroeconomic model.
Agents and technologies.
We consider a single good economy with two types of risk neutral agents, entrepreneurs (type e agents) and lenders (type l agents). There is a continuum of unit mass of each type of agent. All agents live for two periods and maximize their expected end-of-life consumption. At the beginning of their lives, entrepreneurs have access to the production technology: y t+2 = e Rk t with k t min fk t ; k t+1 g and
with R > r and 1 [x] is equal to 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise. At any time,
lenders have access to a storage technology 13 : y t+1 = rk t with r > 1.
The capital market of this economy is similar to the previous section 14 . Entrepreneurs'technology is more capital e¢ cient than that of workers: R > r 2 . Therefore entrepreneurs can borrow capital from workers.
There are two types of …nancial contracts, a short (one period) and a long term (two periods) debt contract.
Long term contracts are imperfectly enforceable (borrowers can default strategically). An entrepreneur who defaults on his long term contracts has to pay a cost on …nal output ( when e R = R, and 0 when e R = r).
The production technology is subject to interim moral hazard: R < r 0 . Finally agents types, …nancial choices and wealths are all observable.
Timing of the model.
At the beginning date (date t), entrepreneurs invest in the production technology and make …nancial (short or long term debt) choices. Workers make loans to entrepreneurs, they invest in the storage technology the capital they have not lent and they invest their labor supply in their labor technology. At the interim date (date t + 1), short term debts are partially or fully rolled-over, illiquid projects may be stopped. At the …nal date (date t + 2), the returns on the di¤erent projects are realized according to what happened at the interim date. Long term and rolled-over short term debts are paid back, agents consume part of their end-of-life wealth and bequeath the other part to their o¤-springs who then go on on the same scheme. 1 3 The assumption r > 1 makes sure that an agent who invests on two successive periods in the storage technology generates more output than an agent who invests on only one period. 1 4 In particular, assumptions H2b, H3-H6 are valid.
Production technology
Entrepreneurs make financial and technological choices. Long term project is continued R R = Figure 5 : Timing of the model.
Optimal debt portfolios without interim moral hazard.
If there were no interim moral hazard 15 , then the expected pro…t of an entrepreneur with initial capital 1 would write as
and his program would consist in
The …rst condition r s (1 + ) makes sure that short term debt repayments are compatible with entrepreneurs proceeding with their illiquid projects. The second condition makes sure that entrepreneurs pay for their long term contracts. We can then write down the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
When there is no interim moral hazard, entrepreneurs choose assets and liabilities with 1 5 Here we remove, and only for this paragraph, the sole assumption that R < r 0 .
identical maturities.
Proof. With simple algebra, it can be shown that (3.1) is a always a decreasing function of . Therefore entrepreneurs choose the largest amount of capital they can borrow that is compatible with exclusively long term liabilities. The optimal debt portfolio therefore does not contain short term debts, the optimal debt equity ratio is f b = r l and expected pro…ts are f b = (R )
Optimal debt portfolios with interim moral hazard.
Let us consider an entrepreneur whose initial wealth in normalized to one, who invests in the production technology with a debt portfolio whose size is and contains short term debts. Given the results of section 2, such an entrepreneur can be confronted to two di¤erent situations. Lenders can ask him to pay for r s or r s as short term debt repayments 16 with .
3.4.1. The safe …nancing strategy.
When lenders ask the entrepreneur to pay for r s the entrepreneur is still able to carry out his project with a large return if and only if r s (1 + ). Then it is incentive compatible for lenders to ask only for r s as short term debt repayments since the entrepreneur is always able to continue his long term project and has no incentive to deviate. The expected pro…t of that entrepreneur 17 then writes as
and his program consists in
What is called here is the minimal value verifying (2.3). 1 7 The expression of expected pro…t t+2 is valid under the assumption that the market for short term debt roll-over is perfectly competitive. This will be the case through out the paper. This assumption implies in particular that the interest rate on rolled-over short term debt is identical to the interest rate on long term debt and that is the minimal value which veri…es (2.3). The entrepreneur pro…ts 19 then write as 1 = (1 + 1 ) R 1 r l .
The risky …nancing strategy.
When lenders ask the entrepreneur to pay for r s then the entrepreneur is able to carry out his project with a large return if and only if r s (1 + ) while when lenders ask the entrepreneur to pay only for r s then the entrepreneur is able to carry out his project with a large return if and only if r s (1 + ).
Therefore when
there are multiple equilibria: on the one hand the roll-over decision of lenders at the interim date determines whether an entrepreneur is able or not to carry out his illiquid project till maturity while on the other hand an entrepreneur's capacity to carry out his illiquid project till maturity determines whether lenders accept to roll-over his short term contracts or not.
Let us note p the probability that lenders decide to ask for full repayment of short term debts 20 . This means that lenders ask the entrepreneur with a probability p to pay for r s and with a probability 1 p to pay for r s . Then the entrepreneur's expected pro…ts 21 write as
Therefore the program of the entrepreneur writes as
s.t. 2 0 The probaility p is now exogenous. It will be determined in the next section as an endogenous outcome of entrepreneurs individual …nancial choices. 2 1 In this case, entrepreneurs pay for their long term debts even in the case where they are compelled to stop their illiquid project. If we considered the case in which entrepreneurs pay for their debts if and only if they are able to carry out till maturity their illiquid project then it can be easily shown that the latter situation is always dominated by the former because entrepreneurs have to pay for default costs while there are no bene…ts as to the optimal debt portfolio (which size is still equal to f b ) or as to interest rates (which are priced with an actuarially fair premium depending upon the repayment probability).
Proof. Comparing 1 and 2 yields the proposition.
When the production technology is su¢ ciently illiquid, i.e. (3.2) is not veri…ed, then entrepreneurs simply take …nancial decisions according to the liquidation risk they anticipate. If an entrepreneur anticipates a low roll-over probability, i.e. a high probability that a run will occur, on his short term liabilities, then he …nances his investment with few short term debts to be sure not to be confronted to a run on his short term liabilities. On the contrary if the roll-over probability is high then entrepreneurs choose more short term debt, the portfolio composition ensuring a complete roll-over in case lenders accept to roll-over short term claims.
Having determined …rms optimal …nancial choices, we now raise the question of how sustainable the situation of asset-liability maturity mismatch can be in a macroeconomic framework. The following section tries to answer this question.
Equilibrium of the capital market.

Runs on short term debt.
To answer the question of whether the amount of short term debt accumulated in the economy is sustainable or not, we de…ne what a run on short term liabilities is and how lenders coordinate to run or not. De…nition 1. In a run on short term debt, lenders ask borrowers to pay for all short term debts whose repayment may change projects returns. The ex ante probability that a run happens is the ratio of the amount of short term debts subject to run to the amount of capital available for potential re…nancing.
This de…nition …rst implies that lenders never run on projects …nanced with debt portfolios ( 1 ; 1 ).
Runs on short term debt are possible if and only if there are projects …nanced with portfolios ( 2 ; 2 ).
Secondly if we note w e entrepreneurs wealth, w l lenders wealth, the proportion of entrepreneurs who play strategy 2 and = w l we , then the amount of short term debts subject to run and the amount of potential re…nancing respectively write as
where i = min ( i ; i ). We still have to determine , i.e. the type of equilibrium (pure or mixed strategy) which appears. The following proposition gives the precise conditions on the type of equilibrium which emerges.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium of the capital market always exists and is always unique. The probability p that a run on short term debt happens and the share of entrepreneurs who choose a portfolio ( 2 ; 2 )
are given by
There are three types of possible equilibria. First there can be a pure strategy equilibrium where all entrepreneurs choose strategy 2 (the risky strategy) and the ex ante probability that a run happens is Then the probability that a run happens is q. Thirdly there can be a pure strategy equilibrium where all entrepreneurs borrow per unit of own capital and the probability of a run on short term debt is zero.
Growth and macro-economic ‡uctuations.
Given the equilibria we have established, we can now compute the law of motion of the macroeconomic capital stock k as function of the wealth distribution (w l ; w e ). The dynamics of the capital stock writes as
where R s is equal to r with a probability p ( ) and R with a probability 1 p ( ). We can then easily compute the mean and the variance of the growth rate of the capital stock as follows.
Proposition 2. If > 1 the average growth rate of the economy Eg and the variance of the growth rate var (g) respectively write as
If 1 then Eg = R 1 and var (g) = 0.
Proof: cf. appendix.
These expressions can be interpreted as follows. The expected growth rate is the sum of two terms:
represents the growth contribution of long term activities while r 
1+
represents the growth contribution of short term activities. As to the growth rate variance it depends only upon the investments made in the long term production technology and …nanced with portfolios ( 2 ; 2 ) since those with portfolios ( 1 ; 1 ) are never subject to any run. At this stage, it is possible to study the variation of the expected growth rate Eg against the volatility of the growth rate var (g). To this end we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, expected growth decreases with and growth volatility increases with . In the pure strategy equilibrium case, expected growth increases with if and only if < 2 + z 1 and growth volatility increases with if and only if < 2 + z 2 .
In the pure strategy equilibrium case, an increase in has two e¤ects. First the share of the macroeconomic capital stock invested in the storage technology increases. This decreases the expected growth rate because the storage technology has a relatively low return. Second an increase in reduces the probability that a run on short term debt occurs because the re…nancing possibilities of lenders are larger. Therefore the investments made in the production technology are more productive on average. The proposition states that the …rst (negative) e¤ect on average growth dominates for large values of while the second (positive) e¤ect on average growth dominates for low values of . As to growth volatility, an increase in both reduces the probability that a run happens and the share of the macroeconomic capital stock invested in the production technology. Based on these two e¤ects, growth volatility decreases with as soon as it is su¢ ciently large.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium case, an increase in also has two e¤ects. First as previously the share of the macroeconomic capital stock invested in the storage technology increases. This decreases the expected growth rate because the storage technology has a lower return. Second an increase in increases the proportion of entrepreneurs who choose the debt portfolio ( 2 ; 2 ). This increases the expected growth rate.
However in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the …rst (negative) e¤ect always dominates the second (positive)
one. As to growth volatility, it increases with because only the second e¤ect is relevant (the proportion of entrepreneurs who choose the debt portfolio ( 2 ; 2 ) increases). Therefore when is low ( 2 + 2 q 2 ), the economy experiences mixed strategies equilibria and the correlation between growth volatility and average growth is negative. On the contrary when is large ( 2 + max n z 1 ; z 2 ; 2 q 2 o ), the economy experiences pure strategy equilibria and the correlation between growth volatility and average growth is positive 22 . 2 2 We focus on these two simple cases although the model has richer predictions because depending upon the parameters of the model, the case where 2 + 2 q 2 2 + max fz 1 ; z 2 g may not exist. In Figure 5 , the diagram represents the case where max fz 1 ; z 2 g > 
Empirical evidence.
In order to test the validity of the growth mean-volatility predictions of the model, we use data from two sources: The Penn world tables and the World Bank …nancial structure and economic development database.
From the …rst source we get data on GDP. We use the GDP per capita in PPP as a measure of output per capita. We compute the growth rate of this variable and the mean and the standard deviation of the GDP per capita growth rate. From the …nancial structure and economic development database, we measure (the ratio of the …nancial sector to the non …nancial sector assets) with two proxies: the amount of liquid liabilities to GDP or alternatively the sum of …nancial intermediaries (central bank, deposit money banks and other …nancial institutions) assets to GDP. The model predicts that growth volatility is negatively related to average growth in countries where the …nancial sector assets are relatively small but positively related to growth in countries where the …nancial sector assets are relatively large. To test empirically this prediction, we estimate on a panel the determinants of the volatility of the GDP per capita growth gvol. We include as right hand side variables, the average GDP per capita growth rate g, a proxy for , an interaction term between these last two variables and control variables x. gvol i;t = i + t + 1 i;t + 2 g i;t + 3 i;t g i;t + x i;t + " i;t
To con…rm the predictions of the theoretical model, we need that the coe¢ cient of average growth be negative while that of the interaction term be positive 2 < 0 < 3 . In line with previous empirical volatility studies, we introduce the log of the level of the GDP per capita in PPP as a control variable which is meant to capture that more developed economies are always less volatile. The econometric results follow. Table 2 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000) on which the mean and standard deviation of the GDP per capita growth rate are computed. All equations have been estimated with an intercept and a correction for heteroscedasticity à la White. The average GDP per capita growth rate is g i;t , the amount of liquid liabilities to GDP is ll i;t , the ratio of …nancial intermediaries assets to GDP is …a i;t and y i;t is the level of GDP per capita in PPP. Beginning of period values have been considered for these last three variables. A ( 100) after the variable name indicates that the coe¢ cient reported is one hundred times the estimated parameter in the regression. All reported coe¢ cients are signi…cant at the 1% level except those in small characters which are not signi…cant at the 5% level. The weighted adjusted R square is reported. Table 4 These estimations give us four results. First, the simple correlation between average growth and volatility is (almost) always signi…cant and negative. This con…rms the standard result of the growth volatility literature (Ramey and Ramey [1995] ). Second the correlation between the development level (measured by the log of GDP per capita) and growth volatility is also always negative (but can be non signi…cant).
Economic development therefore reduces growth volatility (Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1997] ). Thirdly the simple correlation between the size of …nancial intermediaries (measured by ll or f ia) and volatility is (almost) always signi…cant and negative. Finally the interaction term between growth and …nancial intermediaries assets is always signi…cant and positive. Therefore the estimations deliver two di¤erent results. First an increase in …nancial intermediaries assets relatively to the rest of the economy reduces volatility, everything else equal, if and only if average growth is su¢ ciently low. In other words in economies with large average growth rates, …nancial development is likely to increase and not decrease growth volatility. Secondly, the econometric results con…rm the predictions of the model as regards the growth volatility relationship: this relation is more likely to be negative in economies where …nancial intermediaries have a low level of assets relatively to the rest of the economy while it is more likely to be positive in economies where …nancial intermediaries have a high level of assets relatively to the rest of the economy.
Conclusion.
In this paper we have shown that macroeconomic ‡uctuations in the form of liquidity crises can emerge endogenously. When long term …nancial contracts are imperfectly enforceable and in the presence of interim moral hazard, lenders bias debt portfolios towards short term debt. They use this …nancial instrument to overcome the possibility for borrowers to default strategically. However this bias generates maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities and this can lead to global liquidity crises when projects are illiquid. Then, based on this microeconomic mechanism, we have obtained a theoretical result as concerns the correlation between growth volatility and average growth: it is more likely to be positive in economies where lenders are relatively well-endowed but more likely to be negative in economies where they are relatively ill-endowed. Finally we have brought some empirical evidence which con…rms this view. This gives a new insight to the growth average-volatility debate showing that neither polar conception is likely to be coherent with the data.
6. Appendix. 
Incentive compatible contracts.
Let us consider a contract ( ; ). This contract must be such that entrepreneurs are better-o¤ when they pay for their long term debts than when they default. When an entrepreneur is served a contract ( ; ) such
then whatever his decision interim it is always more pro…table for him to pay for his long term loans than to default. Now when > , a necessary condition for an entrepreneur to pay for his long term loans is that he carries out his project and get the large return R. In this case his …nal pro…t is equal to
On the contrary if the entrepreneur decides to default on long term loans then he stops his project at the interim date and get the low return r. His …nal pro…t is then equal to
As is clear is the largest pro…t entrepreneurs can reap when they default since (r 0 ) > (R ). Contracts ( ; ) which ensure that entrepreneurs pay for their long term liabilities therefore need that which, noting = R (r 0 ), simpli…es as 
Equilibrium of the capital market.
To determine the probability of a run on short term debt at the equilibrium, we need to write down the probability that is generated by entrepreneurs best response functions. Entrepreneurs best response functions write as ( ; ) = 8 > > < > > :
Given this function the resulting probability that emerges from entrepreneurs choices writes as (p) = + > q then has no …xed point and we look for mixed strategies equilibria. Given the de…nitions adopted as to how …nancial contracts determine the probability of a run on short term debts, a mixed strategies equilibrium is a proportion which solves the equation q = where R s = r with a probability p and R s = R with a probability 1 p. If w l 1 w e < 0 then all the capital stock of the economy is invested in the illiquid technology whose return is then always equal to R.
Therefore when w l 1 w e < 0 the growth rate of the economy is equal to w + R. On the contrary when w l 1 w e 0, the average growth rate Eg and the growth rate variance var (g) are respectively equal to As to the variance of the gross growth rate, in the mixed strategy equilibrium we have 
